

BENELUX OFFICE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CANCELLATION DECISION
N° 3000493
of 23 August 2024

Claimant: **Lebara B.V.**
Entrada 100, Kantoor 111
1114 AA Amsterdam-Duivendrecht
Netherlands

Representative: **AC&R**
Keizersgracht 212
1016 DX Amsterdam
Netherlands

against

Defendant: **Deutsche Telekom AG**
Friedrich-Ebert-Allee 140
53113 Bonn
Germany

Representative: **Hogan Lovells International LLP**
Atrium - North Tower / Strawinskylaan 4129
1077 ZX Amsterdam
Netherlands

Contested trademark: Benelux registration 1450348



I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

A. Facts

1. On 17 October 2022, the claimant filed an application for cancellation with the Benelux Office for Intellectual Property (hereinafter: "the Office" or "BOIP") in accordance with Article 2.30bis(1)(a) of the Benelux Convention on Intellectual Property (hereinafter: "BCIP"), invoking the following absolute grounds for invalidity:

- I. The contested sign cannot constitute a trademark (Article 2.2bis(1)(a) BCIP)
- II. The contested trademark is devoid of distinctive character (Article 2.2bis(1)(b) BCIP)

2. The application for cancellation is aimed at Benelux registration 1450348, filed on 17 September 2021 and registered on 18 December 2021, of the following mark:



The contested trademark is registered as a colour mark, and the registration contains the following colour description:

"MAGENTA (RAL 4010 Telemagenta)"

3. The cancellation claim is directed against all services of the contested trademark, namely:

Class 38: Telecommunication; rental of telecommunication equipment.

Class 42: Design of telecommunication installations and equipment.¹

4. The language of the proceedings is English.

B. Course of the proceedings

5. The application for cancellation is admissible and was notified by the Office to the parties on 15 November 2022. During the administrative phase of the proceedings both parties filed arguments and documents in support. The course of the proceedings meets the requirements as stated in the BCIP and the Implementing Regulations (hereinafter: "IR"). The administrative phase was completed on 14 September 2023.

¹ The contested trademark is registered in Dutch. Original NL version: Klasse 38: Telecommunicatie; verhuur van telecommunicatie-apparatuur. Klasse 42: Ontwerpen van installaties en apparatuur voor telecommunicatie."

II. ARGUMENTS

A. Claimant's arguments

6. As a first ground, the claimant argues that the contested sign cannot constitute a trademark. According to the claimant, Article 2.1 BCIP entails that there are several conditions that a colour *per se* must meet, namely the 'graphical representation requirement', the 'specificity requirement', and the 'context requirement', the latter two being sub-requirements of the 'sign requirement'. The contested trademark registration seems to meet the graphical representation requirement, since it contains an internationally recognized colour code.

7. According to the claimant, the other conditions have not been met. A colour *per se* is normally a simple property of things and cannot be presumed to constitute a sign. Only when used in a certain context, which should follow from the register, a colour can appear as a sign. Further, a colour sample, when looked up by anyone in the trademark register, does not convey any meaning because it has no manifestation, yet. Only when applied to another object, will it be able to express meaning. The colour can be used in a multitude of configurations, especially since it is registered for services. Since the registration does not contain any information about how and on what object(s) the colour will be used, it fails to meet the context and specificity requirements.

8. As a second ground, the claimant argues that the magenta mark is devoid of distinctive character. He recalls that the ratio of the requirement of distinctive character is to ensure that trademarks are capable of fulfilling their essential function, to guarantee to the consumer the commercial origin of goods or services. A trademark must serve to identify goods or services as originating from a particular undertaking and to distinguish them from goods or services of other undertakings. For trademarks relating to colours *per se*, there is an additional ratio, namely the general interest in not unduly restricting the availability of colours for other traders. The claimant indicates in this context that the defendant holds multiple trademark registrations for colours *per se* and colour combinations.

9. According to the claimant, the magenta mark *ab initio* lacks distinctive character in the Benelux. It does not meet the very high threshold of 'exceptional circumstances' as defined by the CJEU in the *Libertel* case. The use of the colour magenta is not at all unusual for the telecommunication (related) services for which it has been registered. Striking colours such as magenta own a certain capacity of attracting the attention of consumers and are commonly being used in the telecommunications sector in the Benelux, as follows from several examples submitted by the claimant and is mentioned in BOIP's Guidelines on Examination of Absolute grounds². The claimant further refers to the fact that the magenta mark has been refused protection as an EU trademark for inter alia the same services and on the same grounds by OHIM (currently EUIPO). It is, therefore, for the defendant to substantiate that its magenta mark has acquired and retained distinctive character for the relevant public in the Benelux, for the services for which it has registered its trademark.

10. According to the claimant, the magenta mark has not acquired distinctive character on the date of initiating the present cancellation action. Due to the low intensity of use in the Benelux the relevant public

² <https://www.boip.int/en/ip-professionals/regulations-policy/refusals/guidelines>, point 71.

– the general public – cannot (any longer) distinguish the origin of the services in question based on the colour magenta *per se*. The claimant recalls that the possibility to establish distinctiveness acquired through use constitutes a major exception to the rule laid down in Article 2.2bis(1)(b) BCIP, which should be applied narrowly. It must be shown with certainty that the defendant has established the mark as an indication of origin for the goods or services designated by it. Such change in meaning – from an indistinctive colour to a trademark – will only occur if the sign is used as a mark, that is, as an indication of the commercial source on which consumers can rely when choosing between competing offers. According to the claimant, the use of magenta in the telecom sector is commonplace in the Benelux, so the colour alone does not enable the consumer in a reliable way to distinguish between competing offers. The claimant further submits that the evidence filed by the defendant falls short, since it mostly pertains to the Netherlands or countries outside the Benelux that are completely irrelevant, but virtually no evidence pertains to (the public perception in) Belgium and Luxembourg, whereas according to the case-law, (acquired) distinctiveness must be proven in the entire Benelux. Also, the evidence does not concern rental or designs services. The evidence filed shows use of the colour magenta (often in a shade of colour that differs from RAL 4010) in various configurations, with different contours, shapes, and colour combinations, that alter the distinctive character. The claimant emphasises that all evidence should be assessed with exclusion of the T-Mobile or Deutsche Telekom name and logo. Finally, the claimant criticises the market surveys that were submitted by the defendant. All respondents for the first survey are located in the Netherlands (and for other surveys outside of the EU), so the surveys are not representative for the Benelux. The respondents in the Netherlands are likely to have been influenced by the T-Mobile logo (same square with a white T), and the question “wat komt er in u op als u deze kleur ziet bij telecomdiensten of -producten?” (“what comes to mind when you see this colour on telecom services or products?”) is phrased in such a way that it nudges the respondents to guess a commercial origin. The results of the survey are therefore, according to the claimant, not reliable.

11. The claimant concludes that the contested trademark should be declared invalid, for all services, as the sign as registered cannot constitute a trademark pursuant to Article 2.2bis(1)(a) BCIP and is devoid of distinctive character pursuant to Article 2.2bis(1)(b) BCIP.

B. Arguments of the defendant

12. According to the defendant, the wording of Article 2.1 BCIP, which implements Article 3 of the Trademark Directive (2015/2436), makes clear that there are three requirements that need to be met in order to qualify as a trademark:

- (i) The trademark must consist of ‘a sign’;
- (ii) which must be capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings;
- (iii) which must be capable of being represented on the register in a manner which enables the competent authorities and the public to determine the clear and precise subject matter of the protection afforded to its proprietor.

The defendant, therefore, refutes the claimant’s contention that a ‘specificity requirement’ and a ‘context requirement’ would exist. These additional requirements are *contra legem*, since ‘colours (*per se*)’ are explicitly mentioned in the legislation as examples of signs. The defendant also finds that the claimant misinterprets the case-law, and wrongly refers to the Dyson-case, which relates to a different subject matter, namely an ‘undefined multitude of configurations’ for the shape of goods, whereas the subject

matter of the contested trademark is the colour magenta itself for services, so any (auxiliary) goods on which the trademark is used are not subject of the registration. The fact that the magenta mark is classified as a 'colour mark' provides all the information needed to determine the subject matter of the registration, namely a colour *per se*, without shape or contours. According to the defendant, there is no need (nor possibility) to mention the context of use in the registration. If the actual use is trademark use, as a means of identification, a colour can constitute a trademark (and thus also a sign). The market survey clearly evidences that the factual use indeed leads to use as a trademark.

13. According to the defendant, the magenta mark is inherently distinctive. The examination must be carried out by reference to the actual situation, taking account of all the circumstances. The relevant public in the Benelux has become accustomed to recognizing colours as an indication of origin where it concerns telecommunication services. The defendant further states that the alleged lack of distinctive character must be rejected, since this was insufficiently substantiated by the claimant. The decision of EUIPO, to which the claimant refers (*supra*, point 9) is not relevant since it concerns another market (EU vs. Benelux) and refers to a period of twenty years ago. The colour magenta has been hugely successful and has more than proven its capacity to distinguish services during the last twenty years, which is further substantiated by an overview of registrations for the colour magenta in EU countries and an overview of registrations worldwide. The defendant submits a large number of examples of how the mark is used, and states that the actual use is not as a 'property of things' or 'used for its appeal' (decorative nature), but clearly use as a trademark. The possible appeal is not inherent to the colour, but stems from the appeal created by the reputation of the trademark and its proprietor.

14. The defendant explains that the telecom market is very specific and clearly defined. It is, since the liberalization of the market in the late 1980s, characterized by the existence of only a few providers. This can be explained by the barriers for entry in the market, in terms of infrastructure and investment. In the Netherlands, there are only three telecom providers with their own physical network: KPN, T-Mobile and VodafoneZiggo. These providers each use a unique colour to represent their brand identity: KPN uses the colour green, T-Mobile the colour magenta, Vodafone the colour red and Ziggo the colour orange. Besides, there are some virtual network providers that use the infrastructure of one of the physical networks. Examples are Lebara (the claimant), Simyo and Youfone that operate under KPN's physical network, Hollandsnieuwe utilizes the physical network of VodafoneZiggo, and Simpel, Ben and Tele2 use T-Mobile's physical network. An equivalent situation exists in Belgium and Luxembourg, with only respectively four and three telecommunication providers with a physical network, and a limited number of virtual network providers. Due to the very specific relevant market with only a limited number of telecommunication providers, the telecommunications market is particularly well suited for the use of colours as trademarks. Individual colours can be immediately assigned to the individual suppliers, and the public is used to recognizing telecommunication providers by the colours they use. Given the specific nature of the market and the exceptional nature of the colour magenta, the defendant contends that there is a need for a balanced view in relation to the *Freihaltebedürfnis*. The defendant further argues that the magenta mark falls within the 'exceptional circumstances' in which distinctiveness without any prior use is conceivable, referred to in the *Libertel* case, although it is established beyond a shadow of a doubt that the magenta mark has already been used, so that these 'exceptional circumstances' do not need to be met: the number of services for which the mark is claimed is very restricted, the relevant market is very specific, the use of the colour for certain goods or services is unusual and this colour is not normally used for the services to be protected. In this respect, the defendant refers to the example of the colour 'pink; RAL 4003' for armoured tanks or submarines, as mentioned in point 71 of BOIP's Guidelines on Examination of Absolute grounds.

15. The defendant further argues, in case the trademark is not found to be inherently distinctive, that it has acquired distinctiveness. In this regard, he first emphasizes that the evidencing of acquired distinctiveness must not by any means be considered to be an implicit admission that the magenta trademark is not inherently distinctive. Furthermore, the defendant states that the claimant's arguments against acquired distinctiveness are not substantiated and should already for that reason be rejected. The lack of substantiation is all the more relevant since – as the evidence shows – it should be deemed a fact of common knowledge that the magenta trademark has not only acquired distinctiveness, but even has obtained enhanced distinctiveness. The intensity of use or actual presence on the market is not the only factor, as a trademark may be found to have acquired distinctiveness after an overall assessment of the evidence that the trademark has come to identify the goods or services product concerned as originating from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish that product from goods or services of other undertakings.

16. To demonstrate acquired distinctiveness, the defendant explains that the colour Magenta has been in use as a trademark since the '90ties of last century. Due to the extensive, intensive, frequent, regular, and longtime use, which has taken (and still is taking) place via many different outlets and with broad territorial coverage (extending well beyond the territory of the Benelux) by defendant Deutsche Telekom AG ("DTAG") itself or economically related entities such as T-Mobile, T-Systems, or Hotspotdrive, the public in the Benelux has become familiar with and recognizes the Magenta Trademark as an indication of origin for telecommunication services. The defendant provides a comprehensive overview and supporting documents regarding its commercial activities and the use made of the contested trademark. Furthermore, the defendant, without assuming an unobligated burden of proof, offers to provide the Office with further evidence.

III. GROUNDS FOR THE DECISION

A.1 Legal framework - general

17. Pursuant to Article 2.30bis(1)(a) BCIP, an application for invalidation of the registration of a trademark may be filed with the Office based on the absolute grounds for invalidity set out in Article 2.2bis BCIP.

18. It follows from case-law that in the context of an application for a declaration of invalidity based on Article 2.30bis(1)(a) BCIP, the relevant date for the purposes of examining the conformity of the trademark with Article 2.2bis BCIP is that of the filing of the application for registration³. In this case the relevant date is 17 September 2021.

19. In invalidity proceedings on absolute grounds, the contested trademark enjoys a presumption of validity, and it is up to the claimant to raise before the Office the concrete elements which call into question its validity. The Office will therefore limit its examination to the grounds, arguments and evidence submitted by the parties⁴.

³ See by analogy: CJEU 23 April 2010, C-332/09 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:225 (Flugbörse).

⁴ See by analogy: General Court EU 19 October 2022, T-486/20, ECLI:EU:T:2022:642 (Swisse).

A.2 Ground I: Article 2.2bis(1)(a) BCIP

20. The first ground for invalidity that has been invoked by the claimant is that the contested sign cannot constitute a trademark (Article 2.2bis(1)(a) BCIP). According to the claimant, there are several conditions that a colour mark must meet, namely the 'graphical representation requirement', the 'specificity requirement', and the 'context requirement', the latter two being sub-requirements of the 'sign requirement' (supra, point 6). The parties agree that the graphical representation requirement has been met. As for the other requirements, the defendant disputes that these would constitute separate conditions for registration (supra, point 12).

21. In relation to the 'sign requirement', the CJEU considered⁵:

"26. Accordingly, it is for the Court to determine whether Article 2 of the Directive is to be interpreted as meaning that a colour per se is capable of constituting a trade mark.

27. In that regard it must be pointed out that a colour per se cannot be presumed to constitute a sign. Normally a colour is a simple property of things. Yet it may constitute a sign. That depends on the context in which the colour is used. None the less, a colour per se is capable, in relation to a product or service, of constituting a sign."

And:

"39. As to the question whether a colour per se is capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings, within the meaning of Article 2 of the Directive, it is necessary to determine whether or not colours per se are capable of conveying specific information, in particular as to the origin of a product or service."

22. So although a colour *per se* normally does not constitute a sign, it may constitute a sign, depending on the context in which it is used. Contrary to the claimant's view, there is no requirement that this context be stated in the registration. After all, a colour mark concerns a colour *per se*, without any shape or contours. The requirements for colour marks are not necessarily the same as those applicable to other types of marks, to which the claimant refers⁶.

23. The Office therefore considers that, as far as register data is concerned, there are no requirements other than a clear and precise representation as referred to in Article 2.1(b) BCIP. If a colour *per se* meets that requirement, it is not necessarily a sign (usually not), but that depends on its use, more specifically whether the colour is capable of conveying specific information, in particular as to the origin of a product or service. This question is obviously narrowly related to the question of whether it possesses distinctive character. It seems logical that when a single colour is perceived as a distinctive trademark, it is thereby also a sign. The Office will therefore first further examine the second ground invoked, the distinctive character of the (presumed) sign.

A.3 Ground II: Article 2.2bis(1)(b) BCIP

24. The second ground for invalidity that has been invoked by the claimant is that the contested trademark is devoid of distinctive character (Article 2.2bis(1)(b) BCIP). The Office agrees with the claimant that the colour magenta is *ab initio* devoid of distinctive character. It is settled case-law that the perception

⁵ CJEU 6 May 2003, C-104/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:244 (Libertel).

⁶ CJEU 25 January 2007, C-321/03, ECLI:EU:C:2007:51 (Dyson), CJEU 24 June 2004, C-49/02, ECLI:EU:C:2004:384 (Heidelberger Bauchemie).

of the public is not necessarily the same in the case of a sign consisting of a colour *per se* as it is in the case of a word or figurative mark, and there is no indication, nor has this been argued by the parties, that this was different at the date of filing of the application than it is today. The public is accustomed to perceiving word or figurative marks instantly as signs identifying the commercial origin of goods or services, but consumers are not in the habit of making assumptions about the origin of goods or services based on the colour used on their packaging or advertising, in the absence of any graphic or word element. A colour *per se* is normally not inherently capable of distinguishing the goods or services of a particular undertaking.

25. The Office cannot agree with the defendant's contention that the exceptional circumstances referred to in the *Libertel* judgment⁷ would arise in this case. The colour in this case is certainly not as unusual as that referred to in the example of the colour pink for military vehicles in BOIP's guidelines, to which the defendant refers (*supra*, point 14). It is undoubtedly true that, as the defendant explains, the number of telecom providers is rather limited, particularly due to the large investments required to enter this market. It may also be true that telecom providers commonly use colours as business identifiers, and that the public is accustomed to that. However, the Office does not believe that this entails that a colour *per se* would enable the public *ab initio*, i.e. without any prior use, to distinguish these services by their origin from a particular undertaking. If it were true that colours are by definition perceived as trademarks in this economic sector, it would also mean that a few suppliers could easily monopolise the entire range of colours for their own benefit, to the detriment of possible new operators, which would clearly be contrary to the public interest⁸.

26. The defendant further argues that he uses the colour as a trademark. When assessing *ab initio* distinctiveness, however, the use made of a sign must be disregarded. Indeed, the question here is whether a sign is inherently, i.e. independently of any use, perceived as a trademark. The Office considers that this is not the case. However, the use made of the sign does play a role in assessing whether it has acquired distinctiveness. It does not seem illogical to assume that the factual conditions in a market with few providers, each of which has had to invest heavily to enter that market and is unlikely to survive without a serious market share, are relatively favourable to achieve acquired distinctiveness. However, the onus of proving acquired distinctiveness rests on the defendant⁹.

A.4 Acquired distinctiveness

27. Article 2.2bis(3) BCIP stipulates: "*A trademark shall not be declared invalid [...] if, before the date of application for a declaration of invalidity, following the use which has been made of it, it has acquired a distinctive character*". It is therefore for the defendant to prove that, prior to the institution of these proceedings (17 October 2022), the trademark has acquired distinctiveness.

28. This provision is an exception to the rule that signs which are not distinctive, descriptive or which have become customary may not be registered as trademarks. Since it is an exception to the rule, which sets aside the public interest underlying the grounds for exclusion, the bar for acquired distinctiveness is high. Acquired distinctiveness occurs when a significant proportion of the relevant public has come to

⁷ CJEU 6 May 2003, C-104/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:244, point 66 (*Libertel*).

⁸ CJEU 6 May 2003, C-104/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:244, points 54 and 55 (*Libertel*).

⁹ CJEU, 19 June 2014, C-217/13 and C-218/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2012, points 69-71 (*Oberbank*); BenCJ (second chamber) 6 February 2024, C-2022/15, point 15 (*Yellow stitch*).

perceive a sign that was initially (*ab initio*) devoid of distinctive character, as a result of the use made of it, as an indication that the goods or services for which it is registered originate from a particular undertaking. The sign has thus acquired a new 'meaning', so to speak, which is no longer descriptive or non-distinctive (in this case not 'just' a colour but a badge of origin), and has therefore become capable of distinguishing the goods or services in question from those of other undertakings. Acquired distinctiveness is generally the result of (very) long and intensive use.

29. In geographical respects, the bar of acquired distinctiveness is also high. Under the BCIP, the Benelux is an indivisible territory. This means that a sign can only be a valid trademark if it is valid throughout the Benelux. Acquired distinctiveness will therefore have to be demonstrated throughout the Benelux, or in any case there where the trademark was *ab initio* devoid of distinctive character¹⁰. In case of colour marks (or non-word marks in general¹¹), it may be assumed that the assessment of distinctiveness will be the same for the entire Benelux public. Acquired distinctiveness must therefore be proven throughout the territory of the Benelux.

30. To prove acquired distinctiveness, all evidence may be submitted, in particular, concerning the market share held by the mark, how intensive, geographically widespread and long-standing the use of the mark has been, the amount invested by the undertaking in promoting the mark, the proportion of the relevant class of persons who, because of the mark, identify the goods or services as originating from a particular undertaking, and statements from chambers of commerce and industry or other trade and professional associations, as well as opinion polls¹².

31. The defendant provided a comprehensive overview of its commercial activities and the use made of the contested trademark and submitted a large quantity of supporting evidence. The defendant is obviously one of the largest telecom providers in the world, and has used the colour magenta in a consequent way for decades, either himself or through economically related entities, in many different manners: as part of its logo, in shops, websites, packaging, sim-cards, commercials, sponsoring activities, events, news items, etc... In the Netherlands, the defendant has been active under the name T-Mobile as one of (only) three telecom providers with their own physical network. From a market survey submitted by the defendant, it follows that around 60% of the respondents in the Netherlands, when shown the colour magenta and asked what comes to mind in relation to telecom services or products, reply that they think of the defendant. In Belgium and Luxembourg, the defendant seems not to be active as a telecom provider, at least not in the consumer market. The defendant claims to have been active in Belgium under the name T-Systems, but those activities appear to be more business-to-business and not aimed at the general public, to which the services are (also) directed, and are in any case considerably less intensive than in the Netherlands. As the defendant correctly points out (*supra*, point 15), this does not necessarily preclude acquired distinctiveness, since the public can also become known with a trademark in other ways than by its actual presence on the market or by actually buying or using a product or service. However, it does make acquired distinctiveness less likely. While the defendant has certainly shown that the Benelux public outside the Netherlands has also been or may have been confronted with the sign in a variety of ways, the

¹⁰ CJEU 7 September 2006, C-108/05, ECLI:EU:C:2006:530 (EUROPOLIS); BenCJ (second chamber) 16 June 2020, C-2019/6 (Pet's Budget); BenCJ (second chamber) 16 June 2020, C-2019/5 (Sports direct). The same logic applies for an EUTM, where distinctiveness must be proven throughout the EU (CJEU 25 July 2018, C-84/17 P, C-85/17 P and C-95/17 P, ECLI:EU:C:2018:596 (SHAPE OF A 4-FINGER CHOCOLATE BAR)).

¹¹ General Court EU 24 February 2016, T-411/14, ECLI:EU:T:2016:94, point 86 (shape of a bottle).

¹² CJEU 4 May 1999, C-108/97 and 109/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:230 (Chiemsee).

Office considers that it has not been sufficiently demonstrated that as a result, that part of the public has actually come to recognise it as a trademark. As the circumstances and extent of use in the Netherlands are clearly different from those in Belgium and Luxembourg, the results of the market survey also cannot be extrapolated¹³.

32. The Office concludes that the defendant has failed to prove that the colour magenta has acquired distinctiveness as a trademark throughout the Benelux.

B. Other factors

33. The claimant refers to the refusal of the magenta mark by EUIPO and the defendant states that it is registered in several other countries (*supra*, points 9 and 13). In this respect it should be recalled that BOIP has its own responsibility to take a decision on its own merits and based on the facts and circumstances presented and is not bound by decisions of other authorities.

35. To the extent that the defendant offers to submit further evidence (*supra*, point 16), it should be recalled that there is no place for such an offer within the system of Rule 1.31 IR. It is for the parties to decide what arguments they rely on and what evidence they deem useful to submit in support thereof¹⁴.

C. Conclusion

34. Based on the above factors, the Office finds that the contested trademark is (*ab initio*) devoid of distinctive character, and that acquired distinctiveness has not been proven.

35. Since the claim is upheld on the second ground (Article 2.2bis(1)(b) BCIP), there is no need to further examine the other ground invoked (Article 2.2bis(1)(a) BCIP).

¹³ General Court EU 6 March 2024, T-652/22, ECLI:EU:T:2024:152, point 111 and the case-law cited (*Veuve Clicquot*).

¹⁴ BenCJ (second chamber) 18 October 2019, C-2018/2, point 16 (*NUTRILIFE*).

IV. DECISION

36. The application for cancellation is justified.

37. Benelux trademark registration 1450348 is invalidated.

38. The defendant shall pay the claimant 1,420 euros in accordance with Article 2.30ter(5) BCIP in conjunction with Rule 1.44(2) IR, as the cancellation application is upheld in its entirety. This decision constitutes an enforceable order pursuant to Article 2.30ter(5) BCIP.

The Hague, 23 August 2024



Pieter Veeze
(*rapporteur*)

Marjolein Bronneman

Tomas Westenbroek

Administrative officer: Rémy Kohlsaet