Gepubliceerd op vrijdag 11 november 2005
Horen, zien en navolgen
Opinion of Advocate general Dámaso
Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 10 November 2005, Case C-206/04. Muehlens./.OHIM
(ZIRH). Nadere uitleg Lloyd/Loints en tik op
de vingers van het Hamburgse Landsgericht door A-G Colomer.
Cosmeticafabrikant Muehlens stelt oppositie in tegen de aanvrage van het woordmerk ZIRH en baseert zich daarbij op haar oudere woord/beeldmerk SIR. Beiden zijn aangevraagd voor dezelfde waren in o.a. klasse 3. Muehlens stelt dat er auditieve overeenstemming is tussen beide merken en meent, onder verwijzing naar Lloyd/Loints, dat dit voldoende is om gevaar op verwarring aan te nemen. Zowel het de Opposition Division, de Board of Appeal van het OHIM, GvEA en nu ook A-G Colomer zijn het hier niet mee eens.
De A-G legt uit dat de zinsnede "niet valt uit te sluiten dat de enkele auditieve gelijkenis tussen de merken verwarring kan doen ontstaan" uit het Lloyd/Loints-arrest, niet inhoudt dat enkele auditieve overeenstemming tussen twee merken altijd voldoende is om verwarring aan te nemen; verwarring kan zich voordoen, maar dat hoeft niet altijd het geval te zijn:
Cosmeticafabrikant Muehlens stelt oppositie in tegen de aanvrage van het woordmerk ZIRH en baseert zich daarbij op haar oudere woord/beeldmerk SIR. Beiden zijn aangevraagd voor dezelfde waren in o.a. klasse 3. Muehlens stelt dat er auditieve overeenstemming is tussen beide merken en meent, onder verwijzing naar Lloyd/Loints, dat dit voldoende is om gevaar op verwarring aan te nemen. Zowel het de Opposition Division, de Board of Appeal van het OHIM, GvEA en nu ook A-G Colomer zijn het hier niet mee eens.
De A-G legt uit dat de zinsnede "niet valt uit te sluiten dat de enkele auditieve gelijkenis tussen de merken verwarring kan doen ontstaan" uit het Lloyd/Loints-arrest, niet inhoudt dat enkele auditieve overeenstemming tussen twee merken altijd voldoende is om verwarring aan te nemen; verwarring kan zich voordoen, maar dat hoeft niet altijd het geval te zijn:
42. My approach to the admissibility of the appellant’s
submission having been thus clarified, consideration of this part of
the plea must focus on the dicta of the Court of Justice in its
judgment in Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer, referred to above, specifically in
paragraph 28 thereof, where it states that the possibility cannot be
ruled out ‘that mere aural similarity between trade marks may create a
likelihood of confusion’.
43. Logically, the meaning of that sentence is not absolute, as the appellant contends, since the judgment declares that phonetic similarity is sufficient for a referring court, where the products are similar, to decide that such likelihood exists. A grammatical interpretation of those words suggest that the Court of Justice does not rule out the possibility that such similarity is sufficient to infer that there is a likelihood of confusion, but it does not necessarily require that conclusion to be arrived at merely on the basis of acoustic resonances.
44. From the logical and linguistic point of view, where ‘the possibility is not excluded’ that something may happen, it is recognised that it is not very probable and, implicitly, that such an event is unusual. In any case, that statement provides no basis for inferring a general rule according to which it is doubtful that a specific case will arise.
In het onderhavige geval oordeelde de voorgaande instanties dat de begripsmatige en visuele verschillen tussen ZIRH en SIR ervoor zorgden dat, ook al was er (enige) auditieve overeenstemming, er geen verwarringsgevaar te duchten is.
Boeiend wordt het wanneer de A-G uithaalt naar het Landgericht Hamburg, dat het waagde te concluderen dat er wel sprake was van gevaar op verwarring tussen beide merken en daarmee lijnrecht inging tegen eerdere rechtspraak van het OHIM en GvEA.
75. The German court’s decision rejects the Court of First Instance’s thesis that the degree of phonetic similarity between the two trade marks is so insignificant that it will not give rise to any likelihood of confusion, since the degree of identity of the marks is not sufficiently great. In giving reasons for its decision, the Landgericht Hamburg relies on the case-law of the Bundesgerichtshof (German Supreme Court in civil and criminal matters), according to which failure to consider phonetic similarities when evaluating the likelihood of confusion unjustifiably deprives the proprietor of the trade mark of some of the protection to which he is entitled.
76. Even if it is accepted that the national judicial authorities to which Article 234(2) EC applies, such as the Landgericht Hamburg, enjoy a degree of latitude as regards preliminary references, (44) the need for the uniform application of Community law dictates that recourse must be had to Article 234 EC, specifically where the approach taken by a national high court is at odds with that taken by a Community Court, particularly if the decisive impact which a request for a ruling might have had in resolving the dispute is taken into account.
77. The fact that the decision given by the first German court was open to appeal does not diminish the harm caused, essentially by creating legal uncertainty, as the Commission has emphasised. Faced with such a clear conflict of interpretation of a Community provision, the only course open to that court was to use Article 234 EC; (45) it is to be hoped, however, that an appeal court will mitigate the effects of the situation that has arisen, for the sake of interpretative rigour and the European spirit that has presided over the comportment of the judicial authorities in that country, which has always led the field so far as concerns the sincere cooperation with the Court of Justice provided for by the Treaties.
Lees hier conclusie.
43. Logically, the meaning of that sentence is not absolute, as the appellant contends, since the judgment declares that phonetic similarity is sufficient for a referring court, where the products are similar, to decide that such likelihood exists. A grammatical interpretation of those words suggest that the Court of Justice does not rule out the possibility that such similarity is sufficient to infer that there is a likelihood of confusion, but it does not necessarily require that conclusion to be arrived at merely on the basis of acoustic resonances.
44. From the logical and linguistic point of view, where ‘the possibility is not excluded’ that something may happen, it is recognised that it is not very probable and, implicitly, that such an event is unusual. In any case, that statement provides no basis for inferring a general rule according to which it is doubtful that a specific case will arise.
In het onderhavige geval oordeelde de voorgaande instanties dat de begripsmatige en visuele verschillen tussen ZIRH en SIR ervoor zorgden dat, ook al was er (enige) auditieve overeenstemming, er geen verwarringsgevaar te duchten is.
Boeiend wordt het wanneer de A-G uithaalt naar het Landgericht Hamburg, dat het waagde te concluderen dat er wel sprake was van gevaar op verwarring tussen beide merken en daarmee lijnrecht inging tegen eerdere rechtspraak van het OHIM en GvEA.
75. The German court’s decision rejects the Court of First Instance’s thesis that the degree of phonetic similarity between the two trade marks is so insignificant that it will not give rise to any likelihood of confusion, since the degree of identity of the marks is not sufficiently great. In giving reasons for its decision, the Landgericht Hamburg relies on the case-law of the Bundesgerichtshof (German Supreme Court in civil and criminal matters), according to which failure to consider phonetic similarities when evaluating the likelihood of confusion unjustifiably deprives the proprietor of the trade mark of some of the protection to which he is entitled.
76. Even if it is accepted that the national judicial authorities to which Article 234(2) EC applies, such as the Landgericht Hamburg, enjoy a degree of latitude as regards preliminary references, (44) the need for the uniform application of Community law dictates that recourse must be had to Article 234 EC, specifically where the approach taken by a national high court is at odds with that taken by a Community Court, particularly if the decisive impact which a request for a ruling might have had in resolving the dispute is taken into account.
77. The fact that the decision given by the first German court was open to appeal does not diminish the harm caused, essentially by creating legal uncertainty, as the Commission has emphasised. Faced with such a clear conflict of interpretation of a Community provision, the only course open to that court was to use Article 234 EC; (45) it is to be hoped, however, that an appeal court will mitigate the effects of the situation that has arisen, for the sake of interpretative rigour and the European spirit that has presided over the comportment of the judicial authorities in that country, which has always led the field so far as concerns the sincere cooperation with the Court of Justice provided for by the Treaties.
Lees hier conclusie.