De Zweedse merkenwet
HvJ EG, conclusie AG Sharpston, 13 juli 2006, zaak C-316/05, Nokia Corp tegen Joacim Wärdell (Nog geen Nederlandse versie beschikbaar).
Meneer Wärdell is betrapt op het importeren van stickers waarop het merk NOKIA is aangebracht en die bedoeld zijn om aan te brengen op mobiele telefoons. In eerste instantie wordt een verbod opgelegd om verdere inbreuken te plegen omdat de Tingsrätten meende dat er een reëel risico bestond dat meneer Wärdell zou recidiveren. De Tingsrätten bassert zich hierbij op artikel 37(a) uit de Zweedse merkenwet dat stelt dat wanneer er sprake is van een voortdurende inbreuk, een verbod kan worden opgelegd.
De Svea Hovrätten zag het allemaal wat minder negatief in en oordeelde dat meneer Wärdell slechts onvoorzichtig was geweest. Het enkele feit dat niet uit te sluiten valt dat er in de toekomst weer inbreuk kan worden gemaakt, betekente nog niet dat er sprake is van een voortdurende inbreuk in de zin van artikel 37(a) ZMW.
De vraag is of dit artikel, althans de uitleg daarvan zoals door de Svea Hovrätten gegeven, zich verhoudt met artikel 98 van de Gemeenschapsmerkenverordening dat voorschrijft dat de Gemeenschapsmerkenrechter, wanneer hij inbreuk heeft vastgesteld, een verbod toewijst tenzij er bijzondere redenen zijn om dat verbod niet toe te wijzen.
Meneer Wärdell meent van wel. Nokia, de Franse overheid, de commissie en ook AG Sharpston menen echter van niet.
23. First, Article 98(1) of the Regulation is in mandatory terms. It states that where the defendant has infringed a Community trade mark, the court shall issue a prohibition order. That formulation reflects the fundamental right of a trade mark proprietor to prohibit infringement, enshrined in Article 9(1) of the Regulation. If a court finds that the defendant has infringed a Community trade mark, it must therefore as a general rule prohibit continued infringement. It follows that it is only by way of derogation from that general rule that a court may, where there are ‘special reasons’, not issue a prohibition order. The concept of ‘special reasons’ must therefore be interpreted narrowly.
24. Second, the preamble to the Regulation states that ‘decisions regarding the validity and infringement of Community trade marks must have effect and cover the entire area of the Community, as this is the only way of preventing inconsistent decisions on the part of the courts and the Office and of ensuring that the unitary character of Community trade marks is not undermined’. As Nokia, the French Government and the Commission submit, a uniform interpretation of Article 98(1) is the sole way of achieving those aims. An assessment of the degree of risk that the infringement will continue, such as suggested by the Högsta domstolen, will necessarily lead to different results in different Member States. Since it is a fundamental principle that a Community mark should have the same protection throughout the Community, an assessment of risk alone can never constitute a ‘special reason’ entitling a national court not to order prohibition. There are, moreover, obvious practical difficulties in adducing evidence of the risk of future acts. If the likelihood of further infringement were a condition precedent of ordering prohibition, that would place trade mark owners at a disadvantage and risk undermining their exclusive right in their Community trade mark.
25. It may be that in exceptional cases the degree of risk of further infringement is one of a number of circumstances which, taken as a whole, are indeed capable of constituting ‘special reasons’ within the meaning of Article 98(1). However, the national court’s question specifically concerns only the degree of risk of further infringement ‘irrespective of the other circumstances’.
26. It is of course true, as Mr Wärdell submits, that one of the principal objectives of the Regulation is to promote the free movement of goods. It is however hard to see how the free movement of goods would be prejudiced by strong and uniform protection of Community trade marks against infringement. On the contrary, such protection requires that infringement should as a general rule be prohibited. The Regulation, moreover, explicitly links the objective of promoting the free movement of goods with provision for ‘Community trade marks to which uniform protection is given and which produce their effects throughout the entire area of the Community’.
27. Finally, it must also be borne in mind that where, as here, the alleged infringement consists in affixing a sign which is identical to the Community mark to goods which are identical to those for which it is registered, protection of the Community mark is absolute. In such circumstances the derogation should in principle not apply at all. At the very most, it might perhaps apply where it is materially impossible for the defendant to repeat the infringement, for example (to borrow the illustrations given by Nokia) if the defendant is a company which has been wound up or if the mark in question has expired.
28. I am accordingly of the view that the condition relating to special reasons in Article 98(1) of the Regulation is not satisfied if a court which finds that the defendant has infringed a Community trade mark refrains from issuing a specific prohibition of further infringement solely on the ground that it considers that the risk of further infringement is not obvious or is otherwise merely limited.
Lees het arrest hier.
