Gerecht EU bevestigt verwarringsgevaar tussen T-HEAD en oudere HEAD-merken

Gerecht EU 30 september 2026, IEF 23888; IEFbe 4331; ECLI:EU:T:2026:616 (T-HEAD). T-Head (Shanghai) Semiconductor Co. Ltd verzocht om vernietiging van een beslissing van de Tweede kamer van beroep van het EUIPO in een oppositieprocedure tegen de inschrijving van het beeldmerk T-HEAD voor onder meer waren en diensten in de klassen 9, 35, 41, 42 en 45. De oppositie van Head Technology GmbH was gebaseerd op verschillende oudere HEAD-merken, waaronder Oostenrijkse woordmerken en een internationale registratie. Het Gerecht verwerpt eerst het betoog dat de kamer van beroep haar motiveringsplicht had geschonden bij de vergelijking van de waren in klasse 9. Voor zover T-Head bepaalde waren in haar beroep bij het EUIPO niet uitdrukkelijk had betwist, mocht de kamer van beroep aansluiten bij de motivering van de oppositieafdeling. Ook was de motivering niet tegenstrijdig waar onderscheid werd gemaakt tussen gespecialiseerde technologische componenten met meerdere mogelijke toepassingen en waren die volgens hun omschrijving specifiek als computerhardware moesten worden aangemerkt. Voor die laatste categorie, waaronder computerchips, centrale verwerkingseenheden en netwerkhardware, mocht de kamer van beroep aannemen dat sprake was van ten minste een geringe mate van soortgelijkheid met de software waarop de oudere merken betrekking hadden. Ook de overige door T-Head bestreden vergelijkingen van waren en diensten in de klassen 35, 41, 42 en 45 konden volgens het Gerecht standhouden.

Het Gerecht bevestigt vervolgens de beoordeling van het verwarringsgevaar. Het woordelement ‘head’ is het dominante element van het aangevraagde merk, terwijl de letter ‘t’, het koppelteken en het figuratieve element slechts een beperkte invloed hebben op de totaalindruk. De tekens zijn visueel meer dan gemiddeld overeenstemmend, fonetisch ten minste gemiddeld overeenstemmend en begripsmatig identiek voor het relevante publiek dat het Engelse basiswoord ‘head’ begrijpt als ‘hoofd’. Dat sommige waren en diensten slechts in geringe mate soortgelijk zijn en dat een deel van het relevante publiek een verhoogd aandachtsniveau heeft, sluit verwarringsgevaar niet uit. Gelet op de mate van overeenstemming tussen de tekens, het gemiddelde intrinsieke onderscheidend vermogen van de oudere merken en de vastgestelde soortgelijkheid van de betrokken waren en diensten, mocht de kamer van beroep concluderen dat het relevante publiek kon menen dat deze van dezelfde of economisch verbonden ondernemingen afkomstig waren. Daarbij kon tevens worden meegewogen dat T-HEAD als een submerk van HEAD zou kunnen worden opgevat. Het Gerecht verwerpt het beroep volledig en veroordeelt T-Head in de proceskosten.

The likelihood of confusion

90      A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).

91      The Board of Appeal found, in paragraphs 85 to 91 of the contested decision, that, since the signs at issue were highly similar overall, even in respect of the goods and services which were similar only to a low degree and those which required an enhanced degree of attention upon purchase, the degree of visual and phonetic similarity and the conceptual identity of those signs would lead consumers to believe that those goods and services found to be similar originate from the same or related commercial undertakings. Furthermore, it added that, due to the presence of the initial letter ‘t’ in the mark applied for, consumers might get the impression that that mark constitutes a sub-brand of the earlier marks, for instance where that letter had a descriptive meaning, such as to indicate that the sub-brand specialised in technological goods. Therefore, it confirmed that there was a likelihood of confusion, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, in respect of the goods and services referred to in paragraph 89 of the contested decision.

92      The applicant complains, in essence, that the Board of Appeal carried out an incorrect assessment of the likelihood of confusion since it relied, inter alia, on errors in the visual, phonetic and conceptual comparison of the signs at issue. It submits, in particular, that the difference between those signs is such as to rule out there being a likelihood of confusion, even if certain goods and services may be held to be similar. In addition, it adds that the relevant public targeted by the goods and services covered by the mark applied for is highly specialised, which also makes it possible to find that there is no likelihood of confusion. As regards the services in Class 41, it argues that, in the light of the principle of interdependence between the relevant factors, the very low degree of similarity of those services precludes any likelihood of confusion.

93      EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

94      In that regard, it is apparent from paragraphs 84 to 88 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal, in its global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, took into account all the relevant factors, including the average inherent distinctive character of the earlier marks – which has not been disputed by the applicant – and the goods and services covered by the marks at issue, the relevant public and its level of attention, and the degree of visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity of the signs at issue.

95      Moreover, as is apparent from paragraphs 35 to 90 above, the applicant has not succeeded in calling into question the Board of Appeal’s findings relating to the similarity of the goods and services in question, or its findings that the signs at issue were visually similar to an above-average degree, phonetically similar to at least an average degree and conceptually identical.

96      As regards the applicant’s argument concerning account being taken of the low degree of similarity of the services in Class 41, it should be recalled that, according to the case-law cited in paragraph 91 above, a low degree of similarity between the goods or services in question may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the signs at issue. It is true that the principle of interdependence should not be applied mechanically (see judgment of 19 June 2024, Naturgy Energy Group v EUIPO – Global Power Service (gps global power service), T‑312/23, not published, EU:T:2024:399, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited). However, given the above-average degree of visual similarity of the signs at issue, their at least average phonetic similarity and their conceptual identity, the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that there was a likelihood of confusion as regards the services at issue which are included in Class 41.

97      Consequently, it must be found that, following a global assessment and taking into account all of the factors referred to above, the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that there was a likelihood of confusion relating to the goods and services referred to in paragraph 89 of the contested decision.

98      In the light of the foregoing, the applicant’s first plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, must be rejected and, accordingly, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.