Gepubliceerd op maandag 23 januari 2006
IEF 1528
De weergave van dit artikel is misschien niet optimaal, omdat deze is overgenomen uit onze oudere databank.

Het merk achter de jurk

Conclusie AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 19 Januari 2006, Zaak C-259/04. Elizabeth Florence Emanuel tegen Continental Shelf 128 Ltd. Elizabeth Emanuel, de ontwerpster van de trouwjurk van Lady Di maakt bezwaar tegen het (en haar voormalige) merk 'Elizabeth Emanuel' nu zij zelf, kort gezegd, niet niet meer bij het merk is betrokken. (Van de conclusie is nog geen Nederlandse versie beschikbaar).

“It is appropriate to ask whether the change in ownership of a trade mark comprising the name of its owner is deceptive in any circumstances. The answer must be no, for various reasons.

Trade marks are a synthesis of information in any form (…) but, when the connection between the name and the undertaking supplying the services or manufacturing goods under that designation is lost, the question arises whether it can be claimed that the message inherent in the mark is false and whether the person whose identity was assigned with it can contest its validity.

Those issues have been raised in proceedings which, interestingly, can be linked with a very well-known social event, the marriage of the Prince of Wales and Lady Diana Spencer. The splendour and ceremony surrounding the wedding left a profound imprint in the memory of a public captivated by the beauty of the bride, whose dress, of impressive proportions,  was designed by Mrs Emanuel, a fashion designer who, as a result of being entrusted with its creation, gained a prestigious reputation in her business activity.

Against the background of her popularity, she now opposes the registration, by an undertaking with which she has no connection, of a modification of the graphic trade mark Elizabeth Emanuel, which was her creation, and seeks revocation of the industrial property rights in respect of that mark, alleging that, since the links between it and her personally have been broken, the mark no longer reflects reality and is deceptive.

(…)  To complete the general civil-law background to incorporeal property rights, it is necessary, in view of the facts of the main proceedings, to make reference to the general principles applicable to this sector since, in the absence of any ground of nullity or voidability of the transaction by which the ownership is transferred (bad faith, violence or fraudulent application of the law), the principle of good faith prevails, which requires due performance of contracts (pacta sunt servanda) and applies to all the steps taken in order to achieve the purpose of the agreement.

Against that background, a person who sells rights of any nature and subsequently claims them back from a third party, on whatever grounds, is not acting in accordance with the principle bona fides semper praesumitur; such conduct evokes the maxim venire contrafactum proprium non valet, typifying the absence of good will. The logical approach is to accept the consequences of an act of free disposal, provided that there are no grounds such as to justify recovery of what was disposed of.

In short, there is nothing to prevent the transfer of rights in respect of trade marks; indeed, they are frequently transferred in commercial transactions, a fact which is generally known and so common in the world of commerce that, without doubt, it underlies Article 17 of Regulation No 40/94 and Article 21 of TRIPs.

(…)  as the United Kingdom points out in its observations, the Directive does not seek the annulment of trade marks when goods do not satisfy the expectations of the customer because a particular person has ceased to be involved in their creation or manufacture, or for any other reason. In reality, the public is aware that quality may vary for diverse reasons. Consequently, consideration of the concept of deception, as used in the provisions under review, must relate only to the abovementioned essential function..

(…) Therefore, the mere use of a sign, without substantial changes in the way it is communicated to the public, does not have any impact on the stimuli emanating from it, even where, as in this case, the person whose name was used as the trade mark retains no connection with the undertaking that exploits it. The customer’s conflicting perception, in the form of a continuing belief that that person is involved in the production process, inevitably derives from the replacement of one trade mark owner by another, but does not deserve to be classified as a case of deceit, in accordance with Article 12 of the Directive, and therefore the diminution of the presumed deceit with the passing of time, as referred to by the referring judicial authority, is irrelevant.

Account must also be taken here of the considerations set out in the paragraphs dealing with Article 3(1)(g) of the Directive, regarding the average consumer,  who is deemed to be aware of changes in the ownership of industrial property. In the circumstances, there is likewise no change to the essential function of the trade mark. However, in order to give a decision on such deception of the public as may have occurred, it is incumbent on the national court to weigh up the specific circumstances of the case, in order to verify the precise consequences of using the mark.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the mere use of a registered trade mark consisting of a proper name, transferred together with the goodwill with which it is associated, does not lead to deception of the kind referred to in Article 12(2)(b); it is the responsibility of the national judicial authority to consider the particular features of the case in evaluating the influence which the use of that mark may have had on the impression received by the public.

On the basis of the foregoing considerations, I am of the opinion that the Court of Justice should reply as follows to the questions submitted by the Person Appointed by the Lord Chancellor under section 76 of the Trade Marks Act 1984, through the High Court of Justice, by stating that:

(1)      Article 3(1)(g) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks, must be interpreted as meaning that a sign comprising, at least partially, a proper name, assigned together with the goodwill of which it forms part, does not deceive the public, even if it evokes the mistaken impression that that person took part in the design and creation of the goods for which it is used.

(2)      In the same circumstances, the mere use of the registered mark does not deceive the public within the meaning of Article 12(2)(b) of the said directive. It is for the national judicial authority to consider the particular features of the case in evaluating the influence which the use of that mark may have had on the impression received by the public. Lees de conclusie hier.