Gepubliceerd op dinsdag 17 november 2009
IEF 8411
De weergave van dit artikel is misschien niet optimaal, omdat deze is overgenomen uit onze oudere databank.

Vooruitdenken

GvEA, 17 November 2009, zaak T-473/08, Apollo Group, Inc. tegen OHIM

Gemeenschapsmerk. Weigering registratie Woordmerk THINKING AHEAD. Geen onderscheidend vermogen.

27. However, signs which do not enable the public concerned to repeat a purchasing experience, if it was positive, or to avoid it, if it was negative, when making a later purchase of the goods or services in question, are devoid of any distinctive character for the purposes of Article 7(1)(b). Such is the case, in particular, of signs which are commonly used for the marketing of the goods or services concerned. Those signs are deemed incapable of performing the essential function of a mark, that is to say, identification of the origin of the product or service in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 March 2008 in Case T‑341/06 Compagnie générale de diététique v OHIM (GARUM), not published in the ECR, paragraph 29, and the case-law there cited).

(…)

34      Thus, in connection with educational and training services, the disputed word sign is necessarily regarded as a reminder to potential consumers of such services to enrol on courses, to take part in them and to study with the aim, inter alia, of improving their career opportunities or their social position. Contrary to the applicant’s submissions, the expression ‘thinking ahead’, because of its clear and specific meaning, namely, ‘thinking to the future’, when it is used in connection with those services, leads consumers to associate it with their personal future development, even though it is true that educational and training services are also intended to meet a current and immediate need.

(…)
 
37. It follows from the foregoing considerations that, from the point of view of the relevant public, the word sign THINKING AHEAD constitutes, because of its inherent meaning which evokes the future, a principally promotional message in relation to the services concerned in Class 41 of the Nice Agreement. It is therefore likely commonly to be used to market those services and is deemed incapable of performing the essential function of a mark, that is to say, that of identifying their origin (see the case-law cited in paragraph 27 above).

(…)

39. Accordingly, the Board of Appeal rightly concluded that that expression will be perceived by the relevant public primarily as a promotional slogan rather than as a trade mark.

Lees het arrest hier